Radicalisation: what weak signals are really worth

What a weak signal is, and is not

A weak signal is a clue that takes on meaning in a context. A change of behaviour, a broken relationship, a new rhetoric: taken alone, each of these can be explained in several ways. Brought together, dated and placed in a history, they may outline an evolution.

A weak signal is neither proof nor prediction. It does not allow anyone to say that a person will move to action, nor even that the person is radicalised. It draws attention to a situation that may deserve examination, within a defined framework.

That distinction is not a matter of cautious wording. It governs how teams are trained, how observations are collected and how the next step is decided.

What research says, and does not say

Research on radicalisation has produced a robust finding: there is no single profile. The work of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko describes radicalisation as a process at several levels — individual, group and mass — where different mechanisms combine (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). They distinguish in particular radicalisation of opinion from radicalisation of action: holding a radical idea does not mean turning to violence.

The European network of practitioners RAN insists on the same point: risk factors are not causes. Personal vulnerabilities, biographical ruptures, experiences of discrimination, group affiliations, encounter with an ideological offer and relational dynamics combine in a singular way.

Research therefore provides no list of signals whose presence would be enough to conclude. It provides models of understanding, useful for training judgement, not for establishing a diagnosis.

Why there is no typical profile

Three reasons explain that absence.

The statistical base. Violent radicalisation is fortunately rare. A predictive model built on rare cases produces many false positives: it designates as suspects a large number of people who will never move to action.

The diversity of paths. Social profiles, ages, motivations and contexts vary considerably. The same behaviour may stem from an adolescent crisis, a family conflict, ideological adherence or an entirely different cause.

The risk of stigmatisation. A grid of signals applied without discernment ends up targeting entire groups. It then produces two effects opposite to the one sought: it weakens trust and it distracts attention from the situations that genuinely pose a problem.

What an organisation can observe

An organisation is not an intelligence service. It can, however, spot observable facts within its normal operation.

Ruptures. A brutal change of behaviour, appearance, relationships or availability, especially when accompanied by a totalising ideological explanation.

Rhetoric. A stated adherence to an ideology that justifies violence, the designation of a single enemy, refusal of any debate, fascination with acts of violence.

Isolation. A gradual withdrawal from ordinary relationships, a break with close ones, exclusive membership of a group that cuts other ties.

Acts. New behaviours outside the frame: insistent proselytising, propaganda material, unexplained travel, physical or paramilitary training.

None of these elements is enough. What matters is the combination, the duration, the context and the way the person speaks about it.

The French framework

Prevention of radicalisation relies on a public circuit. Situations are reported to the competent authorities, examined at departmental level, and may lead to social, educational or family support.

The French National Assembly's report on public services facing radicalisation recalls the complexity of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of factors at play (Diard and Poulliat, 2019). The Bockel-Carvounas report on local authorities stressed as early as 2017 that only part of the phenomenon falls within local action, and that such action must form part of a partnership with the State (Bockel and Carvounas, 2017).

For an employer or a local authority, the consequence is clear: it is not for them to qualify a situation legally, nor to investigate. It is for them to alert within the established framework, describing dated and observable facts, and to cooperate with the authorities.

Train and frame rather than list

A useful arrangement rests on four elements.

A doctrine. What the organisation considers to be part of its role, and what is not. Without a doctrine, everyone improvises.

A circuit. Who receives a report, who decides to pass it on, who follows it up. A blurred circuit discourages reporting or normalises it.

Training. Managers and field professionals need to understand the mechanisms, the limits of signals and the consequences of an abusive report.

A record. Reported facts must be dated and described, without value judgement. The record protects the person reported as much as the organisation.

What it changes for an organisation

Preventing radicalisation is not a matter of mass surveillance. It is a matter of discernment, procedure and responsibility.

An organisation with a clear doctrine, an identified circuit and trained managers is better placed to spot a worrying situation, to avoid false positives and to act without stigmatising. It is also the condition for the people concerned, or their relatives, to dare to turn to it.

On this ground, see prevention of radicalisation and secularism. For questions of religion at work, see Secularism at work: employers' questions.